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RECENT CASES
Evidence-Hearsay-Mental State Exception To Prove Subsequent Intention-
Administrative Procedure-[Illinois].-The deceased, a sales manager of the plaintiff,
while allegedly on vacation was killed in a collision with a train while driving between
Louisville and Indianapolis. A druggist in Louisville testified that the deceased made
a call on him and several others testified that the deceased told them on the day of the
accident and the day before that he was going to make business calls in Indianapolis.
In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act to review a judgment con-
firming an award of the Industrial Commission for the claimant, held, reversed and
award set aside. The above testimony concerning statements of the deceased are in-
admissible because they are hearsay and not a part of the res gestae. Boyer Chemical
Laboratory Co. v. Indiestrial Commission.x
Res gestae as a criterion for admitting hearsay has been completely discredited,2 yet
Illinois3 and other jurisdictions4 persist in its use to the exclusion of the proper explana-
tion for their conclusions. A correct analysis of the instant case involves two steps:
first, the hearsay step which consists of the declarations in Louisville to prove an exist-
ing intention to call on customers in Indianapolis the next day; second, the inference
step which involves the implication that the intention to call on customers continued
during the trip from Louisville to Indianapolis, which would characterize the act of
driving as being in the course of deceased's employment.
The hearsay step should be no barrier to the admission of the evidence, since there is
a well recognized exception to the hearsay rule which permits declarations of present
intention to show declarant's state of mind at the time.s This hearsay exception is
founded on necessity and relatively high probative value.6 If the deceased were alive,
1366 Ill. 635, 1o N.E. (2d) 389 (1937).
2 Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. gi ('937); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L. J. 229 (1922); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1767
(2d ed. 1923); Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, i U. of Chi. L. Rev. 394, 400
('934).
3 In general: Hoffman v. Stephens, 269 I1. 376, 1o9 N.E. 994 (1gs); Chicago Consol.
Traction Co. v. Mahoney, 230 Ill. 562, 82 N.E. 868 (19o7); Swanson v. Chicago R. Co., 242
Ill. 388, 9 N.E. 210 (Igog).
The Illinois cases on hearsay to prove subsequent intention and act are in great confusion.
See, for example, the inconsistent positions maintained in the following: Siebert v. People,
143 Ill. 585, 32 N.E. 431 (1892); Howard v. People, 185 Il. 552, 57 N.E. 44x (i9oo); Nordgren
v. People, 211 Ill. 425, 71 N.E. 1042 (i9o4); Clark v. People, 224 Ill. 554, 79 N.E. 941 (igo6);
Greenacre v. Filly, 276 11. 294, 114 N.E. 536 (irgi6); People v. Ahrling, 279 Ill. 70, 146 N.E.
764 (1917); but see Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three Years After, 38 Harv. L. Rev.
710, 711, fn. 7 (1925).
4 Sanborn v. Income Guaranty Co., 224 Mich. 99, 221 N.E. 162 (1928); Hines v. Foster, x66
Wash. 165, 6 P. (2d) 597 (1932); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kern-Bauer, 62 F. (2d) 477 (C.C.A.
ioth 1933).
53 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1714, 1725; Hinton, op. cit. supra note i; Morgan,
Res Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 9i , io4 (I937); see Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 496 (1878); Com.
v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 185, 31 N.E. 961 (1892); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S.
285, 12 S. Ct. 908 (1892).
63 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1714, 1421 and 1422; Hinton, op. cit. supra note 2,
402 ff. (1934); see Elmer v. Flessenden, 1s Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (18go); Sugden v. Lord St.
Leonards, i Prob. Div. 154 (189o).
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the contested testimony should be admissible as having a greater value than that which
he would give on a witness stand under the influence of an interest in the outcome of
the case,7 a fortiori it should be admissible when he is dead and there is the added
factor of the impossibility of obtaining other evidence. Moreover, the circumstances
under which the instant statements of the deceased were made indicate no motive for
fabricating his existing intention.8
As for the inference step, there is no question but that evidence of present intention
is always relevant to show subsequent intention,9 although it is not always material.
The probative value of the inference-on which materiality depends-is contingent
on lapse of time, affirmative corroboration, and absence of circumstances tending to
show that the intention would not continue. The probative value of the evidence here
seems high. The contested statements of the deceased's intention occurred from a max-
imum of twenty-four hours to only a few hours before the intention sought to be
proved."0 Moreover the intention to call on druggists does not appear to be subject
to any contingencies or conditions;" it was the type of intention which in the normal
course of events would be likely to continue. Since, however, the value of the affirma-
tive corroborative evidence, i.e., the call on the druggist in Louisville and the un-
finished trip from Louisville to Indianapolis, is not high, the result of the case may
possibly be justifiable.
By statute in many jurisdictions, administrative bodies are not bound by the hear-
say rule and other technical 12 exclusionary rules,13 and in a few states there are dicta to
the effect that their findings of fact will not be reversed even though based solely on
such evidence.14 On the other hand, the majority of states do hold that even where the
statute completely frees the administrative body from statutory and common law rules
of evidence, if the findings are based solely on evidence incompetent in an ordinary court
they will be reversed on appeal.'s Administrative bodies, however, should be regarded
7 Hadley v. Carter, 8 N.H. 40 (1835); Elmer v. Flessenden, 15i Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208
(i8go); Hinton, op. cit. supra note 2, 415; 3 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1714.
8 Elmer v. Flessenden, 153 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (1890); Hinton, op. cit. supra note 2,
413; see also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Urlin, 185 U.S. 271 (1894); but see Hutchins and Slesing-
er, State of Mind to Prove an Act, 38 Yale L. J. 283, 296 (X929).
9 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 102 (2d ed. 1923); see Cook v. Moore, ii Cush. (Mass.) 213, 216
(1835).
1o Maguire, op. cit. supra note 3, 721 (1925); Hinton, op. cit. supra note 1, 394, 413 fn. 53;
see Moloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 335 Il. 64, 166 N.E. 530 (1929).
11 I Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 102; Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 394,413 fn. 53 (i934).
12Hearsay not a technical rule of evidence: Englebretson v. Ind. Com., 170 Cal. 793, 151
Pac. 421 (1915); McCouley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, io4 Ad. 617 (1918).
'3 Ross, Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings before Workmen's
Compensation Commissions, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 (1923); 1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 9
§ 4(c) p. 45; Stephens, Administrative Tribunals and the Rules of Evidence 3 (1933).
14 Ross, op. cit. supra note 13, 290; Cf., i Wigmore, op. cit supra note 9, § 4(c) p. 48; Reid v.
Automatic Electric Washer Co., 189 Ia. 964, 179 N.W. 323 (1920); see Jillson v. Ross, 38 R.I.
145, 94 At. 717 (1915)-
'5 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 App. Div. 450, 155 N.Y. Supp. 1 (1915); State ex
rel. Berquist v. Dist. Ct. of Beltranin County, 145 Minn. 127, 176 N.W. 165 (1920); Streeters'
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as having sufficient discretion to evaluate such proof;16 appellate courts should only
interfere where there has been a clear abuse of discretion as where completely irrele-
vant testimony is the sole basis for the decision of the board17 In any event, even if
there were some doubt, in an ordinary court, as to the admissibility of the particular
hearsay evidence in question here, it is a highly questionable practice for an appellate
tribunal to reverse a decision of an administrative board admitting such evidence.
Execution-Installment Satisfaction of Judgment-Imprisonment for Debt-
[New York].-The defendant, a federal employee, was ordered to pay a judgment in
installments of $20 per month, in accordance with § 793 of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act, which provided that "notwithstanding the [garnishment statutes] .... the
court may order the judgment debtor to pay to the judgment creditor .... in install-
ments, such portion of his income, however or whenever earned or acquired, [as may
be just] after due regard [has been had] for the reasonable requirements of the judg-
ment debtor and his family, if dependent upon him, as well as any payments required
to be made by the judgment debtor to other creditors ..... The court may .... mod-
ify an order made under this section upon application of either party upon notice to
the other." The defendant earned $230 per month, had no children, no financial ob-
ligations, aside from $48 per month rent and other living expenses; the whereabouts of
his wife was unknown. Upon his refusal to pay, he was adjudged in contempt of court
and committed under § 8oi.2 On appeal the defendant contended that such commitment
was a deprivation of due process and an interference with a federal instrumentality.
Held, § 793 is not unconstitutional, in absence of a showing that order directing pay-
ment was unreasonable, or made without regard to ability to pay. Reeves v. Crown-
shield.3
Section 793 was designed primarily to aid creditors.4 Prior to its enactment, ap-
proximately seventy-five per cent of money judgments in New York were never paid.s
Dependents v. Hunter, 9 3 Vt. 483, io8 Atl. 394 (1919) Connolly v. Industrial Accident Com.,
73 Cal. 405, i6o Pac. 239 (i916); see Ross, op. cit. supra note 13, especially p. 290.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 148, § 153. The provision is not as liberal and has received no
more liberal an interpretation than the statutes in other states: Chicago Packing Co. v. Ind.
Board, 282 BI. 497, n8 N.E. 727 (1918); Chicago and A. R.R. Co. v. Ind. Board, 247 Ill. 336,
113 N.E. 629 (I916).
x6 Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property i69 (1928); I Wigmore, op.
cit. supra note 9, § 4(b) p. 28; see Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of the
Law 35 (1927); Henderson, Federal Trade Commission 64 (1924).
'7 See Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 5o Harv. L. Rev.
909, 922 (1937).
Cahil's N.Y. C.P.A. § 793 (6th ed., i93i), Laws of 1935, c. 63o.
Cahill's N.Y. C.P.A. § 8oi (6th ed., 1931), Laws of 1935, c. 63o; see § 793 as amended by
Laws of 1937, c. 586.
3 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937), annotated ii A.L.R. 392.
4 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaroff, 157 Misc. 796, 797, 284 N.Y. Supp. 665, 666 (1936);
Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E. (2d) 283 (1937).
s Compton & Co. v. Williams, 248 App. Div. 545, 547, 29o N.Y. Supp. 984, o86 (1936);
Survey of Litigation in New York, Johns Hopkins Univ. Inst. of Law (193I); Levien, The
